One contribution of 8 to a discussion meeting issue 'Verified trustworthy software systems' . We present recent work on building and scaling trustworthy systems with formal, machine-checkable proof from the ground up, including the operating system kernel, at the level of binary machine code. We first give a brief overview of the seL4 microkernel verification and how it can be used to build verified systems. We then show two complementary techniques for scaling these methods to larger systems: proof engineering, to estimate verification effort; and code/proof co-generation, for scalable development of provably trustworthy applications.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a number of impressive breakthroughs in the formal code-level verification of real-life systems. They demonstrate the feasibility of provably trustworthy systems. In this paper, we show how we can address the remaining challenge of making formal proofs more repeatable and scalable.
These breakthroughs range from the verified C compiler CompCert [1, 2] , to the verified microkernel seL4 [3] [4] [5] , the concurrency verification in CertiKOS [6] , the verified conference system CoCon [7] , the verified ML compiler CakeML [8] , the verified interactive theorem provers Milawa [9] and Candle [10] , the verified crashresistant file system FSCQ [11] , the verified crypto implementation of OpenSSL HMAC [12] , the verified distributed system IronFleet [13] and more-not to mention significant mathematical theorems such as the four-colour theorem [14, 15] , the mechanized proof of abstraction. We demonstrate the approach using a functional language for the implementation of low-level systems code such as file systems.
seL4 retrospective
The seL4 kernel [5] is a third-generation microkernel [25] of the L4 [26] microkernel family. It is a general-purpose microkernel, suitable for a wide range of applications. This is intentional. Instead of restricting the application to a basic separation kernel, pure hypervisor, security kernel, server platform or aviation real-time kernel, we chose to maximize return of investment for the formal verification by designing a kernel that is general enough to be configured for all of these scenarios, without having to undergo re-verification.
For this reason, seL4 provides basic OS mechanisms such as interrupt delivery, threads, message passing, address space separation and access control, instead of policy, which shapes what a specific system and application is allowed to do, how much memory is being used, how resources are separated from each other or not, and whether the system is static or dynamic. The mechanisms are formally verified once and for all, and policy can be configured. Higher-level theorems such as separation theorems, integrity and confidentiality will have well-formedness assumptions about the policy in the system, but they apply to wide classes of policies and therefore to wide classes of systems. Other theorems, such as functional correctness, apply to all policies, and therefore to all user-level systems that are run on the kernel.
Recent additions to the feature set of seL4 include real-time scheduling and direct support for hardware-virtualization extensions such as Intel VT-x and VT-d and ARM hypervisor extensions and ARM SystemMMUs. The former simplify building hard-realtime systems on seL4 and enable logical temporal isolation in mixed-criticality systems; the latter simplify the use of seL4 as a type-1 hypervisor running unmodified guest operating systems.
The kernel is available on a number of ARM platforms (ARMv6, ARMv7, ARMv7a and ARMv8), as well as Intel x86 and x64, but also on RISC-V. The verified platform has advanced from ARMv6 to ARMv7, with ARMv7a and Intel x64 close to completion. The kernel is available as open-source software, including its proofs and specifications [5] . Figure 1 shows one of the main application scenarios of seL4: providing isolation between trusted and untrusted components of a system, between critical and uncritical functionality. The idea is to reduce the trusted computing base (TCB) to the truly critical components of a system, while at the same time allowing rich functionality by running legacy guest operating systems and other large components next to the critical functionality. The seL4 kernel safeguards any access to sensitive hardware resources and provides strong separation between components with configurable and access-controlled communication channels between them. These channels can be implemented by synchronous message passing, shared memory or semaphore-like notifications. Authority to resources can be delegated to subsystems for dynamic use, can be managed from a supervisory component or can be statically fixed at system initialization time. As we will see later, the flexibility of seL4's general-purpose mechanisms allows us to employ it in securing a rich set of systems and applications without further formal verification work.
(a) The seL4 verification
The main feature of seL4 is the degree to which we have formally analysed its behaviour. Historically, the initial formal verification [3] was a functional correctness proof between the C code of the kernel and its abstract formal specification in Isabelle/HOL. Functional correctness means that every behaviour of the C code is correct according to the abstract formal specification, i.e. the C code is a formal refinement of the abstract specification. In the following years, this analysis has both broadened and deepened. Figure 2 gives an overview. Earlier work [27] describes and analyses the verification process in detail. Figure 2 shows the main artefacts of the verification chain of seL4. To the right, we have, from the bottom, the worst-case execution time (WCET) analysis [28] [29] [30] [31] , which is performed on the binary of seL4 in a modified and enriched version of the Chronos tool [32] . The binary code of seL4 is the only code artefact that is part of the verification trust chain. Even though the C code and a high-level Haskell implementation of the kernel are imported into the theorem prover, neither of these nor their translation into the prover are required to be correct. The formal property is about the semantics of the binary [33] , and the only trusted import step is the one from the real binary into the representation of the binary in the theorem prover. This eliminates the need to trust the compiler as well as the question whether the semantics of the C subset that we use in the seL4 verification is consistent with the C standard (seL4 uses C99). While it is still desirable for these to align, it is not necessary for correctness: if the compiler has a defect, and that defect is modelled accordingly in the semantics, the automated validation pass between C and binary semantics will pass, and the rest of the proof will correctly take the non-standard behaviour into account and show that it still satisfies the specification. The binary validation process to C is automatic and relies on a set of tools, including Isabelle/HOL, HOL4, Z3 [34] and Sonolar [35] . From the C code up, we prove formal refinement between C code semantics and design-level executable specification, and between executable and abstract specification. At this stage, we have functional correctness to a very deep level of detail. The intent of the abstract specification is to cover all user-visible behaviour, including error behaviour. This proof alone already yields many desirable properties such as termination, absence of undefined behaviour, absence of buffer overflows and absence of code injection. However, functional correctness alone does not yet tell us that the specified behaviour is also the intended behaviour, that it is able to enforce higher-level security properties and that there is no way to circumvent these properties by clever, unexpected use of the kernel application programming interface (API).
These are properties we prove in addition on the abstract specification. In figure 2, this is indicated by the boxes 'confidentiality' (in this case intransitive non-interference [36] ), 'integrity' [37] and 'availability' [37] . Integrity is the property that state cannot change without write-authorization; non-interference is the property that says a separated component cannot tell the difference between different behaviours of other components, i.e. cannot read or even infer (via observations made on storage channels) spatial (memory) information without authorization; and availability means that resources cannot be taken away without authorization. Spatial availability is implied by integrity and authority confinement, the latter of which is also a (verified) precondition of our integrity property. Temporal availability is implied by WCET analysis on the kernel level and by either separation in the sense of non-interference or real-time schedule enforcement for the system level.
While some properties, like WCET, can only be reasoned about over the binary, we note that the security properties above were much easier and faster to prove on the abstract specification than by proving them directly on the code level. Functional correctness is the theorem that allows us to transfer abstract properties to binary-level properties 2 and thereby allows us to significantly reduce the amount of work necessary for future proofs. This is a general observation that also applies to other classes of code, in particular to generated code with generated proofs. The real power of a generated functional correctness proof is the effort reduction in reasoning at a higher level.
(b) Understanding the verified properties
To gain an understanding what these properties are useful for, figure 3 shows the relationship between them. Availability and integrity are base-level properties that are important for both safety and security. Without integrity (i.e. with the possibility of arbitrary data changes), it is impossible to predict the behaviour of a system, and without availability of resources, the system will not do anything. Confidentiality is most important in the security domain, which attempts to prevent information leaks, and where it is sometimes even safe to stop execution to prevent such a leak. Timeliness (e.g. WCET) is a property that is most important in the safety space. If the flightcontrol system of a helicopter provides its output too late, safe operation cannot be guaranteed. All four properties together give us the full isolation that seL4 can provide.
Any proof about real-world systems must make fundamental assumptions. The seL4 proofs are no different. The model of execution makes a number of implicit assumptions, which we detail below, and the security proofs make additional explicit formal assumptions about the access control set-up of the kernel. The latter are simple restrictions that can be checked explicitly in the theorem prover for each concrete system. The former are more difficult to pin down. The main implicit assumption of the functional correctness proof, and thereby of all seL4 proofs, is that the model of binary execution accurately reflects hardware behaviour. The model does not include details about execution time (as mentioned, WCET analysis is performed in a separate analysis), it does not contain the translation look-aside buffer (TLB) and caches, it does not model the initialization of the kernel and the boot process of the machine, and it contains only a very high-level abstraction of the context and mode switch, as well as of the devices the kernel accesses, in particular the interrupt controller and timer. Other research has shown that this list can be reduced further, e.g. by reasoning about devices more explicitly [38, 39] or by modelling context switching in more detail [40] . The absence of time in the model is important for information flow: the proof does not show the absence of timing side channels. Another implicit assumption is the soundness of the verification tool chain.
It is easy to think that traditional testing does not make such assumptions. This would be wrong. Although tests are usually conducted on the binary code, the test harness is rarely the deployment platform, and the main assumption of tests is that the test vectors are representative of real inputs under real operating conditions. In particular for operating systems code, this is hard to achieve. For instance, to observe effects of TLB misbehaviour, it would not be enough to achieve the highest level of code coverage that aviation certification such as DO178-C demands for Level A code: coverage of all decisions on all code paths. The misbehaviour would be caused by wrong data written to page tables, not by taking a particular path in the control flow. Testing is necessary to validate model assumptions and confirms user expectations with respect to specifications, but it is not free of assumptions itself.
(c) Verified systems
So far, we have looked at the formal properties of seL4 itself. To lift these properties to entire systems running on top of the kernel, we need to configure it such that it satisfies the policy preconditions of the security theorems and implements the desired isolation and communication set-up of the system. We cover these in more detail in separate work on system initialization [4, 41, 42] and the verified CAmkES component platform [43, 44] for seL4.
An example of a set-up where seL4 is used to provide security properties for the entire system is the mission computer, or vehicle-specific module, of Boeing's Unmanned Little Bird (ULB), an autonomous optionally piloted helicopter. The helicopter, which performed successful test flights on seL4, is used in the DARPA HACMS (High Assurance Cyber Military Systems) program as a demonstration platform to show how formal methods can be used to secure autonomous vehicles against cyber attack. To provide such properties while also running legacy code and proprietary software, the architecture of the system is divided into critical parts such as flight planning, potential attack vectors such as outside communication, and untrusted software such as Linux virtual machines with proprietary code. The architecture is constructed such that formal analysis and high-assurance software construction can be concentrated on the potential attack vectors, and such that untrusted software does not have enough access control privilege to damage the system even if it behaves fully maliciously. The kernel enforces this access control set-up, and the security properties above can be used to reason about the integrity of the trusted critical components. Together with the isolation properties, we can make predictions about bounds on the behaviour of the system. To validate the realism of the assumptions made in building the system, the HACMS program contains a Red Team that conducts penetration tests against the systems built in the program. Even with full root-level access to the Linux virtual machine, simulating a previous successful penetration through an external attack vector on the legacy software, the Red Team was not able to break out of the isolation and adversely affect the behaviour of the system. The same Red Team performed successful attacks against baseline versions of the test vehicles in the program. This does not prove security, of course, but it gives indication that the scenario is realistic.
(d) Scale and complexity
With such success, what is left to be done? The main challenge for formal verification remains to be scale and complexity. Figure 4 gives an impression of the scale of the seL4 proofs (including user-level components) compared to other proof developments in the Archive of Formal Proofs (AFP) [45] , an archival library of Isabelle/HOL developments.
While the entire archive currently contains over 1.4 million lines of proof script, the average size of an entry in the archive is only about 4700 lines. In comparison, the entirety of all seL4 proofs consists of over 600 000 lines of proof script, almost half the size of the entire archive and two orders of magnitude larger than an average entry. While the level of depth and breadth of the seL4 verification is extensive, seL4 is, with about 10 000 lines of C code, still not a very large code artefact. The graph in figure 4 contains the Verisoft project [46, 47] , which also worked on operating system kernel verification and reached a similar number of lines of proof. This means the size of the seL4 proofs is not especially excessive. Even large mathematical theorems such as the four-colour theorem and the odd-order theorem (also shown in the figure) are smaller than these software verifications, although they reach a similar order of magnitude.
To make formal verification more routine, these numbers need to shrink and at the same time need to require less human effort. In previous work, we have analysed basic proof engineering aspects that could be improved [48] , and increased the automation that is available for code verification [49, 50] . The following two sections investigate the issue from two further angles: predicting cost and effort, so proof projects can be managed effectively; and drastically reducing verification effort by generating proofs automatically-thereby enabling us to reason about higher levels of abstraction.
Proof estimation
Before formal software verification can truly enter the mainstream, we need better predictive models for its required cost, duration and effort. 'How much and how long?' is a question that all software engineering project leaders must be able to answer and that all software companies must be able to provide to customers. If we want verified software to become the default in specific application areas, we need to provide project leaders with means to produce quotes on verification, to put a price on a proof, to commit to a delivery date in a contract and to estimate the resources needed for the project.
Despite the recent successes in formal verification, there has been little effort in gathering the empirical data required to build such models. Additionally, significant differences between verification frameworks make it difficult to directly compare the resulting artefacts. Finally, understanding the cost and effort required to produce a verified artefact is only the beginning. Like all software, verified code needs to be updated to satisfy changing requirements, and we need to understand how difficult it will be to adapt the corresponding proofs.
To begin answering these questions, we performed several in-depth investigations into the seL4 proofs. As mentioned, proof maintenance is an important issue, but to start with, we focus on the initial development of proofs only. The initial verification took approximately 20 person-years to complete over 4 years and produced over 200 000 lines of Isabelle proof script. Today, the seL4 proof has grown to over 600 000 lines of proof and now includes proofs of confidentiality and authority confinement; it is continually updated to integrate new seL4 features and support new hardware platforms. Together, all the seL4 proofs constitute a rare and large dataset of verification artefacts, with detailed, version-controlled information about their evolution, maintenance, contributors, etc.
Through a retrospective analysis, we sought to identify leading indicators of verification effort and cost. A software verification project will iterate through several phases, ranging from expressing the requirements, formalizing one or more levels of specification, developing the implementation and proving that the implementation satisfies its specification. Each of these phases may lead to changes and require re-work in other ones: the proof may uncover a flaw in the requirements, or the implementation with a flaw in the specification. At the start of the project, and often at each of these stages, the project leader needs to estimate the remaining cost required to complete the verification. We analysed the existing seL4 specification, code and proofs to understand the impact of each artefact on the total effort of the project.
Before we describe these analyses in more detail, we should acknowledge that the overall problem is clearly not solvable in general. There is no reliable function that takes a set of requirements and predicts the overall duration and cost for a proof project. Many mathematical theorems look deceptively straightforward, e.g. Fermat's last theorem, the Kepler conjecture or the four-colour theorem. These are all simple to state and yet took decades or even centuries to prove. Such problems can be encoded into programs and would have their required cost significantly underestimated by any predictive mechanism. What we can strive towards is a predictor that is applicable to certain classes of programs: with specifications that are not mathematically complex and for which historical data of similar verified programs exist. These data will become available as the successes of software verification continue. In this respect, estimating proof effort is no different from estimating implementation effort: incomplete or uncertain predictions are better than none at all, and novel projects are at greater risk of having their costs underestimated.
With that in mind, we performed three investigations, relating specification size to code size, then proof size to effort and, finally, specification size to proof size.
(a) Specification versus code: linear
The first investigation [51] revealed a linear correlation between the number of lines of Isabelle required to specify each seL4 API call, and the number of lines of C in its implementation. We additionally calculated the COSMIC function point (CFP) [52] count for each API call and compared it against its implementation size, but this turned out to correlate only poorly. Both analyses were done by 'slicing' the seL4 implementation for each API call, only keeping code along the call path for that call. performed on a functional user requirements (FUR) document. There is no FUR for seL4, and so instead we used the seL4 user manual, which has a similar target audience (users) and level of abstraction as a FUR. The analysis shows a poor correlation between CFP count and code size in the case of seL4. We also compared CFP count to specification size for the two specifications (abstract and executable), leading to similar results. By contrast, figure 5b,d,f shows the scatterplot relationships between the size of the abstract specification, the executable specification and the implementation, for each API function. These do reveal a strong linear relationship between each pair.
Formal specifications would typically be defined later than FURs, because they are much more precise. Nonetheless, they are ideally defined relatively early in the project life cycle, and so appear to be a promising target for code size estimation. Seen from another angle, these results also indicate that estimation on the verification effort could equally be based on the specification or the implementation. When the specification is indeed produced first (as is the case for seL4, where the earliest artefact produced was the executable specification, then the abstract specification and finally the implementation), then it could be used as a base to estimate both code size and proof effort (see further investigations below). When the code happens to be produced first, then it could be used to estimate specification size, which in turn would lead to proof effort. Note the use of conditional: our analyses only reveal relationships on existing artefacts; deriving a predictive model is still an open question, as we will discuss below.
The linear relationship between code and specification size might appear worrisome: large code will have large specifications. Note that this result is for specifications of functional behaviour. To gain confidence in large specifications of this nature, we should prove higher-level properties about them, such as integrity and confidentiality in seL4, which have much smaller, and more standardized, descriptions.
(b) Proof versus effort: linear
Our second investigation [53] showed another linear correlation, between the size of a proof, measured in lines of Isabelle, and the total effort required to write it (in person-weeks). We divided the seL4 proof into six distinct proof artefacts, and compared the total effort and final size for each. We included three major specifications, also measured in lines of Isabelle, in the analysis. Additionally, historical data were taken from the repository where proof change size is correlated with self-reported effort. Both of these results showed strong linear correlations, shown in figure 6 , although with significantly different coefficients.
(c) Specification versus proof: quadratic
Finally, our third investigation [54] showed a quadratic correlation between the size of a lemma statement and the total number of lines required to prove it. Here, lemma statement size was 
and confidentiality. Additionally, we included two proofs from Isabelle's AFP [45] in the analysis: JinjaThreads [55] and SATSolverVerification [56] . We consider the set of lemmas that comprise each project, comparing the statement size of each lemma to its proof size. Within each project, we observed a consistent quadratic relationship, but with a wide range of coefficients.
An important caveat to this result is that, in most cases, this correlation is much weaker unless lemma statement size is idealized. Often lemmas are stated in more detail than is formally required: concrete terms are given where parameters would suffice. This is done both for clarification and to facilitate automated reasoning. Such overspecified lemmas have larger statement sizes than their proofs would suggest, obscuring the observed relationship. To mitigate this, we discount definitions from lemma statements which never appear in their proof. In other words, the idealized size of a lemma statement is the size it would have had if it were written in its most general form. We argue that this idealization is sound because it could be approximated by the application of domain-specific knowledge; a proof engineer seeking to apply a predictive model to her specification would first prune any obviously unrelated definitions. In figure 7 , we show the results of a quadratic regression of this idealized statement size against proof size for each of the six projects.
Using the same approach, a more in-depth study of the entire AFP by Blanchette et al. [57] showed, among other results, that this quadratic correlation only holds (with R 2 > 0.7) for ∼ 50 of the ∼ 200 articles examined. However, the best-fitting articles were most significantly represented by those related to software verification. This gives additional evidence that the observed relationship holds for a larger class of software verification proofs, although not formal proofs in general.
(d) Discussion
Put together, these results seem to (transitively) indicate a quadratic correlation between the size of the specification and the effort that will be needed to prove that an implementation will satisfy this specification. Such an effort indicator, in the growing world of verified software, is a first; but more work is needed to strengthen this claim, and provide reliable verification project management models and tools. Among the many open questions, the most significant is whether we can build a predictive model from these results. We list here a few of the challenges towards this goal.
Firstly, the artefacts measured in our three investigations do not strictly match. This is for both technical reasons and data availability. For instance, slicing the effort per API function (similar to slicing code size in our first investigation) would require much more fine-grained bookkeeping of which precise proofs each engineer was working on at any given time. The data are not available at this granularity for seL4, but could be tracked on new projects for a more rigorous link between the analyses. Our work helps in identifying the kind of data that should be recorded. Another instance is the lemma statement size from the third investigation: additional work is needed to show that it correlates with the specification size as measured in the first.
Secondly, although the third investigation demonstrates a correlation between lemma statement and proof size, their precise relationship varies between proofs; the coefficient computed for one proof cannot be immediately used as a predictive model for another. A potential solution would be to base an initial model on a previous project, but refine it iteratively as the proof is developed. Additionally, as more verified software is built, we might build a database of domain-specific models to draw upon.
Thirdly, a major difference between retrospective analyses and predictive model is the existence of artefacts. Our analyses work on a snapshot of history: they take as input artefacts at a given point in time, typically at the point they are 'done for the first time', and before they go into a maintenance mode where they get incrementally updated. And they compare the metrics of various artefacts at this one time. In particular, they assume that the size of the 'final' specification Figure 7 . Relationships between idealized statement size and proof size for the six projects analysed.
is fully known when trying to predict the size of its proof. In reality, the development of these artefacts is iterative and interleaved. Once again this indicates that an iterative model would be required to take this process into account. Related to this, our analyses focused on the process of building verified software from the ground up, with little focus on predicting the effort required to modify existing proofs. Arguably, understanding the maintenance cycle of proofs is even more important than understanding their initial development: seL4 took 4 years to develop and verify but has been maintained for over twice that time. Previously [3] we noted that, during the original verification of seL4, a change to less than 5% of the code resulted in 17% of the proof being re-worked. However, other changes were relatively isolated and had a less dramatic impact. An in-depth analysis of a completed proof would probably be able to inform such a prediction. This might include, for example, how many lemmas reference a particular function, or how many proofs inspect a particular definition? A change could then be measured by the number of functions/definitions it touches, and then we could compute how pervasive that change is likely to be throughout the proof.
Finally, our investigations mainly focused on seL4, with some analysis of two developments from Isabelle's AFP. Although other work by Blanchette et al. supports the quadratic correlation between specification and proof size in the context of software verification, the other two relationships have little empirical evidence beyond seL4.
To further advance the field of understanding and predicting proof effort, we propose that several investigations need to occur: an analysis of multiple large-scale verification projects, an experiment in building a predictive model in the early stages of a project, and a subsequent refinement of that model into an iterative one that incorporates proof updates and maintenance.
Although we have made good initial steps towards providing methods and tools for cost and effort estimation of verified software, we have also exposed a number of areas of future work required to strengthen their rigour, practicality and reliability. Our goal is for both new and ongoing verification projects to perform similar investigations, ultimately contributing towards building practical predictive models of developing verified software.
Code/proof co-generation
Even as formal verification starts to become a more predictable activity, its cost still remains relatively high. Much of this cost arises due to the sheer volume of manual work required currently to verify critical systems software like seL4. For example, the cumulative size of the seL4 proofs of functional correctness and security now exceeds 600 000 source lines of proof (see §2), which as we saw in §3 is directly correlated to the cumulative effort required to produce them (now in excess of 20 person-years). Further, assuming that the level of effort required to verify a piece of software grows quadratically in response to the software's size, as suggested by the quadratic relationship between statement size and proof size mentioned in §3, there is clearly a limit to how far one can scale this style of manually intensive software verification. A new approach is needed, therefore, if we are to scale software verification to entire critical systems. In this section, we report on recent work that suggests how to radically reduce the effort required to verify well-architected systems code. This approach is based on a simple realization: verifying a piece of code will always be more expensive than writing it, and at present is around half an order of magnitude more so. This suggests that a promising way to improve verification productivity is to invest more effort into writing code such that the verification burden is reduced later. For instance, use of an unfamiliar language in implementation can be outweighed by far by a significant reduction in formal verification cost later.
To make this effort shift, we carefully designed a new programming language called Cogent for writing verified systems code [58] . Figure 8 depicts the Cogent approach. Cogent compiles to efficient C code, which easily integrates with existing systems APIs and abstract data types, while being designed as a purely functional language, making it very friendly to reason about formally. This makes proving properties of programs written in Cogent far easier than for traditional C code, because the level of abstraction is much higher. Additionally, Cogent's compiler automatically proves that the C code it produces is a correct compilation of the functional source program [59] . Therefore, Cogent facilitates obtaining verification guarantees on par with the seL4 approach by mere equational reasoning over pure functions, without unduly sacrificing performance-the remainder of the reasoning is entirely automatic. A key ingredient for achieving this double act is Cogent's linear type system, which allows pure Cogent functions to be compiled to efficient C code without the need for a garbage collector [60] , while still providing the abstraction necessary to facilitate verification. To demonstrate Cogent's utility for producing efficient, verified systems software at much lower cost, we used it to implement two file systems, ext2fs and a custom flash file system called BilbyFs. For the latter, we then proved the functional correctness of two key file system operations. Our results indicate that Cogent allows verification effort to be meaningfully reduced (by around a third to a half) without unfairly trading away performance. We chose file systems as our case study as they are common but critical systems components of non-trivial complexity, whose functional correctness and performance is relied upon by the remainder of the operating system as well as all applications, but which in practice have been shown to be relatively error-prone [61] . Thus, they present an ideal candidate for implementation and verification via Cogent.
Languages like Rust [62] , Cyclone [63] and Habit [64] are examples of other languages based on the idea that more abstraction and more static checks through more expressive-type systems in systems languages will result in safer, less buggy code. Cyclone does have a formal semantics, and one of the aims of the Rustbelt project is to produce such a semantics for Rust. However, none of these exisiting more abstract systems languages provide a certified compilation or proof co-generation.
(a) Language restrictions
Perhaps most important about Cogent's design is what it leaves out. We explicitly chose to exclude from Cogent's design certain features of mainstream systems languages, in order to favour verification productivity over expressiveness and to ease the job of the compiler to automatically generate correspondence proofs for the C code it emits. These restrictions include the absence of recursion or built-in iteration constructs, as well as the fundamental restriction imposed by Cogent's linear type system that all linearly typed variables be used exactly once in the program. Avoiding iteration eases the automatic C correspondence proofs, although we expect we can lift this restriction in the future to allow the addition of well-behaved iteration constructs to the language. As mentioned earlier, Cogent's linear type system and the restrictions it imposes are fundamental to allowing the programmer to work at a sufficiently high level of abstraction to ease proving properties of Cogent programs, while simultaneously allowing Cogent code to be compiled to efficient C.
Cogent provides a useful escape hatch from these restrictions, however, in the form of a C foreign function interface that allows Cogent programs to call functions implemented directly in C. Thus, Cogent programs are written against a library of C abstract data types (ADTs), including appropriate iterators for collections and compound structures implemented as ADTs. Our experience writing the two file systems in Cogent has shown that this design is a sound tradeoff: Cogent's existing C ADT library is reused between the two file systems, and is sufficiently general to be used by other file systems, such that we can amortize the cost of verifying these components separately over many different file systems.
The uniqueness restriction imposed by linear typing, requiring that all linearly typed variables be used exactly once in the program in order to ensure that no aliases can ever exist, is known to be too onerous for writing general-purpose code, and some data structures cannot be expressed at all. However, we found that it is manageable for the domain of well-modularized file system implementations, given a suitable ADT library against which to program. Modularity is key here, as linear types purposefully restrict the kind of aliasing common in highly coupled software. However, they also make many common data structures that naturally involve aliasing (e.g. cyclic graphs) impossible to encode in Cogent, and therefore they must be implemented directly in C. A benefit of linear types in the context of Cogent is that they can be used to thread state through the program in a very fine-grained manner, which simplifies verification.
(b) A taste of Cogent
To give a feel for what it is like to program in Cogent, figure 9 depicts a snippet of Cogent from our ext2fs implementation, specifically the ext2_inode_get()function. This function looks up an inode on disk, given its inode number inum. Line 3 declares the type of this function. It takes three arguments: an ExState, which is a reference to an ADT embodying the outside environment of the file system; an FsState, a reference to a Cogent structure that holds the file system state; and U32, an unsigned 32-bit integer that in this case is the number of the inode to be looked up. It returns a result of type RR (defined on line 1), which is a pair. Its first component c is mandatory data that must always be returned, while the second component is a tagged union value which signals whether the function succeeded (Success a) or not (Error b), where a and b are result values for the respective cases. ext2_inode_get()(line 3) always returns both the ExState and FsState; when successful, it also returns a VfsInode reference to the looked-up inode; otherwise, it instead also returns a U32 error code.
ext2_inode_get()first calls (line 6-7) the Cogent function ext2_inode_get_buf(), which, after more calculation, internally calls an ADT function to read the corresponding block 
We use these to deserialize the inode from the buffer into a VfsInode structure.
In this situation, simple linear types are unnecessarily restrictive. Passing the linear value buf_blk to deserialise_Inode() in line 12 would consume it, so deserialise_Inode() would have to return it as an additional result for it to be used again later on in the program. This is rather onerous, given that deserialise_Inode() never modifies the buffer. The '!' operator (in '!buf_blk', line 12) allows us to temporarily escape the use-once restriction of the linear type system: it indicates that within the right-hand side of = here, buf_blk is used read-only and can therefore be referenced multiple times without consuming it. The type system prevents deserialise_Inode() from modifying the buffer that is holding the inode from being deserialized. Moreover, it ensures via a simple type-based alias analysis that no references to buffer or parts of it can be returned, as this would result in aliasing. Current development efforts in Cogent are focused on making this alias analysis more fine-grained.
For the Error case (line 22), the result includes an error code that is simply propagated to the caller along with the return values that were mandatory. The Success/Error case distinction is repeated following the attempt to deserialize the inode from the buffer. In either case, the buffer must be released, by calling the ADT function osbuffer_destroy(), whose type signature (line 24) suggests it consumes the buffer (since the buffer is absent in the return type).
Note that, in this function, Cogent's linear type system would flag an error if the buffer buf_blk was never released. ext2_inode_get() will only type-check if all of the Error cases are handled. In this way, Cogent's type system helps to catch many common forms of errors in systems code.
Also observe that the mandatory ExState and FsState values are threaded through the function. The ExState value encompasses all external states, and so includes, for instance, Linux's buffer cache. Because Cogent is a purely functional language, it makes side effects explicit. This means this ExState is passed to osbuffer_destroy() explicitly, which then returns a new ExState reference that encompasses the external state of the world after the buffer has been released. This does not mean that large structures are copied at run-time. In practice, Cogent's linear type system allows the ExState update in osbuffer_destroy() to be performed inplace, as it is not possible to copy the state. The same is true for the other functions that each consume and return an ExState or FsState.
It is obvious from figure 9 that Cogent's current surface syntax for error handling is unnecessarily verbose. The textual overhead for the regular error-handling pattern can easily be reduced by additional syntactic sugar in a future language iteration, as alluded to above, without touching the verification infrastructure.
(c) Verification effort
The Cogent language is by far not unique using programming language technologies and linear types in a systems context-for instance, the Singularity OS [65] used both before. What is unique is Cogent's application of these techniques to increase formal verification productivity.
We refer the interested reader to existing publications [59, 60] for a detailed explanation how the Cogent compiler generates the automatic proofs of correspondence between the C code it emits and the pure, functional Isabelle/HOL shallow embedding of the Cogent source program also generated by the compiler.
In this section, we concentrate on explaining how and why further reasoning over this shallow embedding is simpler than writing traditional functional correctness proofs of systems code, such as those for seL4. To do so, we draw on our experience proving functional correctness for two of the key file system operations of BilbyFs, our custom flash file system that we implemented in Cogent. Similar to seL4's functional correctness proofs, we prove functional correctness of these operations against a top-level abstract specification of their correct behaviour [66] phrased as a non-deterministic functional program in Isabelle/HOL. Just as with seL4, the functional correctness proofs for BilbyFs relied on establishing global invariants of the abstract specification and its implementation. For BilbyFs, the invariants include, for example, the absence of link cycles, dangling links and the correctness of link counts, as well as the consistency of information that is duplicated in the file system for efficiency.
Importantly, unlike with seL4, none of the invariants had to include that in-memory objects do not overlap, or that object-pointers are correctly aligned and do point to valid objects. All of these details are handled automatically by Cogent's type system and are justified by the C code correctness proofs generated by the Cogent compiler. Thus, Cogent considerably raises the level of abstraction for proving properties of systems programs.
Even better, when proving that the file system correctly maintains its invariants, we did so by reasoning over pure, functional embeddings of the Cogent code that the compiler has already automatically proved are correctly implemented by the generated C code. Because they are pure functions, these embeddings do not deal with mutable state (as e.g. the seL4 ones do). Thus, there is no need to resort to cumbersome machinery like separation logic [67] to reason about them: each function can be reasoned about by simply unfolding its definition, and the presence of separation between objects x and y follows trivially from x and y being separate variables.
One way to attempt to quantify the verification effort reduction afforded by Cogent is to compare the cost of performing the BilbyFs functional correctness proofs, per line of Cogent code verified, to that for the seL4 proofs, per line of C code verified. We performed such a comparison in [58] , discovering that roughly 1.65 person-months per 100 C source lines in seL4 are reduced to ≈ 0.69 person-months per 100 Cogent source lines in BilbyFs.
We should note, however, that this comparison is between a partial proof of functional correctness (for BilbyFs) to a completed one (for seL4). It is possible that, were one to complete the BilbyFs proof, additional file system invariants would be discovered that would need to be proved, even for the two file system operations of BilbyFs that have already been verified. In this case, the effort per line of Cogent would necessarily increase. We believe that all such invariants have already been discovered, but the only way to be sure is to complete the functional correctness proof for the remaining operations of BilbyFs. Nevertheless, we believe it is clear that Cogent affords a meaningful reduction in verification effort by about a third to a half.
(d) Performance
In previous work [58] , we conducted a detailed performance analysis of the two Cogent file system implementations, using various file system micro-benchmarks. We also looked at macro-benchmarks [60] , and summarize the high-level trends here.
Overall, the Cogent file system implementations perform within 10-20% of their native counterparts. (For BilbyFs, which is a custom file system, we manually wrote a native C implementation against which we compared the performance of its Cogent implementation.) These performance overheads are due to the fact that the Cogent implementations tend to use data structures that strongly resemble those of the original C, rather than more idiomatic functional data structures, which are handled better by our compiler. For some operations, the C implementation would rely on unsafe features for performance, where the Cogent implementation uses slower, but easier-to-verify techniques, which lead to additional copying of data. In most cases, the overheads for these do not lead to a major performance penalty, but there are pathological cases, where copying happens inside a tight loop, which can lead to a slowdown of an order of magnitude for that specific operation. As we will discuss in §4e, the upcoming version of Cogent addresses this shortcoming.
Occasionally, some overheads are introduced in C code generation: generated code displays patterns which are uncommon in handwritten C and so might be missed by the C optimizer, even if trivial to optimize. One way to address this would be to generate code directly in the compiler's intermediate language that is consumed by its optimizer, or to explore different backends, for example, LLVM. Table 1 shows some application-level micro-benchmarks that compare the performance of the Cogent implementation of BilbyFs against a handwritten C implementation of the same file system. The evaluation configuration is a Mirabox [68] with 1 GiB of NAND flash, a Marvell Armada 370 single-core 1.2 GHz ARMv7 processor and 1 GiB of DDR3 memory, running Linux kernel 3.17 from the Debian 6a distribution. The first scenario clones the git repository of the language Go [69] , creating 580 directories and 5122 files, for a total of 152 MB. The next test compiles the Filebench-1.4.9.1 source code [70] with 44 C files for a total of 19K SLOC. The third application extracts a large tarball (an archlinux distribution), and the fourth measures the total size of a large directory structure. The tar command has a 20% slowdown, but all other scenarios show the formally verified Cogent version performing within 5% of the unverified native C implementation.
(e) Future work
Cogent is an ongoing project, and we intentionally omitted many features from the first version of the language, as we prioritized implementing the full compiler and verification pipeline over aggressive optimization, expressivity and user friendliness. This enabled us to conduct the case studies, which allow us to make the decisions on the basis of actual data.
As we discussed in §4d, we identified some usage patterns which lead to significant performance penalties. This occurs whenever we have to read a large data structure from the storage medium and traverse it in memory. In C, this can easily be done in-buffer, without deserializing and copying the data a second time. The downside is, however, that the resulting code is extremely hard to verify. Addressing this problem was our first priority, as Cogent's linear type system prevents us from using any kind of aliasing, making it impossible to avoid copying. Fortunately, region types, another flavour of substructural types, do exactly allow the type of controlled sharing we need, without losing assurances essential for verification. We are currently in the process of introducing region types to Cogent. A program that is well typed in the linear type system is still well typed in the region type system, as the linear constraints are strictly stronger. The region information can be inferred and need not be provided by the user.
Writing Cogent programs can be tedious, and while the introduction of region types will improve the situation for the user, there is still much we can do through straightforward means such as adding syntactic sugar or the introduction of specialized language constructs. Consider the ext2_inode_get function we discussed above. The code is quite typical for systems code in that there is a considerable amount of error checking and error handling involved. In Cogent, the treatment of values of union type (such as the result type in the example, which has two variants, Success and Error) has to be exhaustive. From a correctness perspective, this has the advantage that it statically ensures that all errors are handled. However, mostly, the error-handling code just passes the error it received from the callee back to the caller after freeing all the memory allocated in the function so far. These default situations could be expressed much more concisely by adding specialized language constructs. Owing to Cogent's type system, the compiler even knows which objects have to be deallocated before returning, so the default clean-up code could be automatically generated. Independent of the language, we cannot always avoid serialization and deserialization of data. In fact, a significant portion of file systems code is typically concerned with this monotonous and error-prone task. Data description languages address exactly this problem by generating the code automatically given specifications of the serialized and deserialized format. Following a similar approach as PADS [71] , we are currently working on adding language-level support for data (de-)serialization to Cogent.
The current version of Cogent already demonstrates the benefits of expressive type systems for automatic verification. This is not surprising. After all, type checking asserts properties of the code at compile time, and the more details are encoded in the type system, the more information we have. Cogent's type system at the moment only scratches the surface of what is possible in this respect, and it will be interesting to investigate this further by extending Cogent's type system to support refinement or even dependent types.
Conclusion
We have given a brief overview of more than a decade of work around the formal verification of the seL4 operating system microkernel. It remains to this date one of the largest and most detailed software verifications in the field.
We have argued that this kind of formally verified OS kernel can be directly applied, without further expensive formal verification, to enhance the security and safety of software systems. If we do invest further verification effort, we can reach an even larger class of systems, and have a realistic chance of significantly contributing to the solution of large-scale problems such as the current state of cyber security, which is developing into an existential threat to developed society.
To make this contribution, formal verification has to become more manageable and less expensive. We presented two areas of ongoing research that address these: proof effort estimation and code/proof co-generation.
There is much more to be done to reach cost parity with traditionally engineered high-quality, yet low-assurance software, but it can already be said that formally verified software is firmly within reach.
Data accessibility. The seL4 code, specification and proofs, as well as the Cogent compiler and proofs, are available on github [5, 72] .
